Forthcoming
Barbieri, A., D. Bordini., A. Tacca (eds.), Argumenta, Special issue on Perceiving High-Level Properties.
Bordini, D. "Introspection and the Transparency of Experience." In: A. Giustina (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Introspection. London: Routledge.
Bordini, D., A. Dewalque & A. Giustina, "Inner Awareness: Past and Present." In: D. Bordini, A. Dewalque, A. Giustina (eds.), Consciousness and Inner Awareness. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Paternoster, A. “La questione mente/corpo alla luce delle neuroscienze”, in C. Del Bò, P. Rumore (a cura di), Filosofia oggi. Le grandi sfide per pensare il presente, Carocci, Roma.
Pinna Pintor, A. Contro il sensomotorio, Il Mulino, Bologna.
2026
Voltolini, A. “The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for A Higher-Level Property to Be Perceivable”, Argumenta 1–16. DOI 10.14275/2465-2334/20260.vol
Voltolini, A. "Against Seeing in Mirrors Without Seeing-in", Philosophia 1-11. DOI 0.1007/s11406-026-00975-5
2025
Barbero, C. “Literature and Perspective”, Syzetesis XII, 229-253, https://doi.org/10.53242/syzetesis/117.
Calzavarini, F.. "The conceptual format debate and the challenge from (global) supramodality". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 76(1), 45–74.
Di Bona, E. “Amodal completion in vision and audition. A relationship between perception and mental imagery, Analysis, anaf006, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaf006.
Di Bona, E. “Kinds of Noise: On the Objective and Subjective Conceptions of Noise,” In: Vassilicos, B., Torre, G., Pellizzer, F.T. eds., The Experience of Noise. Palgrave Macmillan, 33-53. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-82802-7_2.
Piredda, G. Guida rapida alla mente estesa, con L. Coccia, in “La mente situata. Una breve antologia”, a cura di Danilo Manca, ETS Pisa.
Piredda, G. "Photography and social networks: a case study for situated affectivity", Philosophical Inquiries, ISSN 2281-8618
Sacchi, E., Barbieri, A. “In Defence of a Sui Generis Disjunctivistic Account of the Mark of the Mental”. In A. Voltolini (ed.), Marking the Mark of the Mental, Springer, Synthese Library, pp. 155-185.
Sacchi, E. “The Representational and Phenomenal Richness of Perceptual Experience”. Theoria 39(3), 289–314. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.25523.
Sacchi, E. "Against the Conceptualist Argument against Sensory Liberalism." Argumenta: 1-15. (Early View) https://www.argumenta.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Argumenta-Elisabetta-Sacchi-Against-the-Conceptualist-Argument-against-Sensory-Liberalism.pdf.
Tomasetta, A. “A Theory of Phenomenal For-me-ness”, in A. Voltolini (ed.i), Marking the Mark of the Mental, Spinger, New York, 141-150.
Voltolini, A. (ed.), Marking the Mark of the Mental. Synthese Library, volume 511. Springer.
Voltolini, A., “Presentational Character, Feeling of Presence and Presentification: Affinities and Differences between Imaginative and Perceptual Experiences”, Analysis, DOI :10.1093/analys/anae103.
Voltolini, A., “Seeing in Shadows”, Philosophia, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-025-00855-4.
2024
Barbero, C. and Voltolini, A., "How One Cannot Participatively Imagine What One Could Cognitively Imagine", Philosophia, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00753-1.
Barbieri, A. “The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness: Prospects for a Phenomenal Character-based Account”. Philosophia, 1–24.
Bordini, D. “Something about the Question of Aboutness: Comments on Crane”. Australasian Philosophical Review, 8(1): 31-41, https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2024.2485187.
Calzavarini, F.. "Rethinking modality-specificity in the cognitive neuroscience of concrete word meaning: Responses to commentators". Language, Cognition, and Neuroscience, 39(7), 878–890.
Calzavarini, F.. "Rethinking modality-specificity in the cognitive neuroscience of concrete word meaning: A position paper". Language, Cognition, and Neuroscience, 39(7), 815–837.
Calzavarini, F. and Voltolini, A. “A Supramodal Thorough Account of the Molyneux Question”. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.11573.
Calzavarini, F. and Voltolini, A. “The Different Bases of the Meaning and of the Seeing-in Experiences”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15, 621–644.
Di Bona, E.. “Perception and Cognition of Music Components”, De Musica https://doi.org/10.54103/2465-0137/22569
Piredda, G. (with R. Heersmink and M. Fasoli), "Introduction: Affectivity and Technology – Philosophical Explorations", Topoi, ISSN 1572-8749.
Piredda, G. Che cosa vuol dire “tecnologico per natura”? Un (brevissimo) viaggio al confine tra naturale e artificiale, R-esistenze. Culture etiche e artistiche differenti, Artificiale/Naturale. Edizioni Albertina Press - Gl Ori.
Tacca, A. and Gilbert, F.. "Just copy-paste me! Assessing the risks of epistemic dependence on Large Language Models". In A. Strasser (Ed.), Anna’s AI Anthology: How to live with smart machines?. Xenomoi Verlag, 31–52.
Tomasetta, A. “Analytic Phenomenology: A Guided Tour”, Argumenta, 9, 2, 297-316.
Voltolini, A., "Perceptual Experiences of (Depicted) Absence", JoLMA 5 (2), 459-476.
Voltolini, A. “Amodal Completion: Imaginative or Perceptual?” In I. Vendrell-Ferran, C. Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations, London: Routledge, 158-170.
Voltolini, A. “Is What We See in the Picture the Same As What the Picture Presents?”, Journal of Comparative Literature and Aesthetics 47, 145-155.
2023
Calzavarini, F.. "The empirical status of semantic perceptualism". Mind & Language 38(4), 1000–1020.
Calzavarini F., Voltolini A. “Pictures as Supramodal Sensory Individuals”, in A. Mroczko- Wąsowicz and R. Grush (eds.), Sensory Individuals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 403-418.
Paternoster, “Sul concetto di comprensione”, Sistemi Intelligenti, XXXV, 2, 231-250.
Voltolini, A. “Perceiving Aesthetic Properties”, British Journal of Aesthetics 63, 417–434.